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I. INTRODUCTION

Incoming students enter American law schools by and large
with little knowledge of the law or how to "think like a lawyer."
Our typical American first-year curriculum is therefore quite
sensibly tailored to deliver them the law and to develop their
legal thinking in as efficient and effective a way possible. Thus,
the typical curriculum is characterized by heavily edited
appellate court opinions, scrubbed of unnecessary and meddling
facts, to allow students to focus more narrowly on the law. It
also includes large classes conducted through the Socratic
* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School in Chicago.
I would like to thank the editorial staff of the John Marshall Law Journal
from Atlanta's John Marshall Law School for their outstanding editorial
work on this piece. All errors, of course, are my own. I presented an earlier
version of this article at the International Future of Legal Education
Conference in February 2008 at the Georgia State University College of
Law.
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Method, an intense dialogue between a student and professor
that allows the professor to push the student to a deeper level of
understanding. The first year concludes with a final exam based
on a hypothetical fact scenario that allows students to
demonstrate their new-found knowledge and analytical skills by
applying concrete law and principles to static, predetermined
facts in a carefully controlled exercise. In short, the typical
first-year curriculum is precisely tailored to help those with
little knowledge of the law quickly learn the law.
While the central premise-that our incoming students by
and large have little knowledge of the law-is true, it is also
true that our students increasingly come to us with mature
intellectual and moral reasoning capabilities in other areas of
their lives. For example, more and more students come to law
school with professional experience, graduate degrees,
significant life experiences, and families and other
responsibilities in which they have honed more advanced
reasoning skills. Even students who come to law school right
out of college have relatively mature reasoning capabilities. In
other words, even if our first-year students have not yet learned
how to reason about the law, they have learned how to reason
about other complex subjects, including those requiring a moral
aptitude. Even if they have not yet learned that the law is full of
ambiguities and indeterminacies, they have dealt with
ambiguities and indeterminacies in other areas of their lives.
And even if they have not yet seen how law is made-with
lawyers as active agents in the law, not passive recipients of the
law-they certainly have seen how knowledge in other subjects
is so often created, not merely given.
Our incoming students might apply these more mature
reasoning capabilities to the law, but we do not let them. By
focusing first on our students' lack of knowledge of the law, the
typical first-year curriculum neglects their more mature
reasoning capabilities in areas outside the law. This neglect
comes with an opportunity cost-the cost of failing to build
upon what our students bring to law school. But worse, it also
yields tangible harm by regressing our students' intellectual and
moral development before helping them re-progress later in law
school.
This essay begins with a review of some of the intellectual
and moral developmental theories as they relate to legal
pedagogy. The essay then examines the typical first-year
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curriculum and attempts to place it in the context of those
theories. I argue here that the typical first-year curriculum
moves students backward before it moves them forward in the
intellectual and moral development progression-that it
regresses them before it progresses them and that this is not just
a waste of time but also positively destructive. Finally, I offer
an alternative or complementary approach to the typical firstyear curriculum-actual legal work in the first year-that is
designed to progress, not regress, students as intellectual and
moral thinkers.
II. MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT

Perhaps the best known developmental theorists are Jean
Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg.' Both use a "stages of growth"
model to describe the intellectual and moral development of
individuals: just as our physical bodies develop in stages, so too
our intellectual capabilities and moral reasoning develop in
stages.2

Piaget traced cognitive growth from concrete thinking to
abstract thinking in four stages. 3 He claimed that the two

1. Piaget's and Kohlberg's (and other developmental theorists') work has
been described in a variety of secondary sources, many of which I rely upon
in my brief overview here. See, e.g., Paul T. Wangerin, Objective,
Multiplistic, and Relative Truth in Developmental Psychology and Legal
Education, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1237 (1988); Walter H. Bennett, Making Moral
Lawyers: A Modest Proposal, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 45 (1986); Steven
Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential Teaching, 1
CLINICAL L. REV. 505 (1995); Susan Daicoff, (Oxymoron?) Ethical
Decisionmaking by Attorneys: An Empirical Study, 48 FLA. L. REv. 197
(1996); Joseph M. Williams, On the Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models
of Growth and Development, 1 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 1 (1991).
Different authors describe and categorize the stages in each theory in
slightly different ways. I describe them here at only their most rough and
abstract level.
2. Neither Piaget nor Kohlberg is uncontroversial.
Particularly,
Kohlberg's methodology has been subject to scrutiny because his studies
included only boys, not girls. See generally Hartwell, supra note 1, at 51222 (summarizing the strains of criticism of Kohlberg's theory and
methodology).
3. Williams, supra note 1, at 3-4; see also Wangerin, supra note 1, at
1243-44, 1274-81.
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earliest stages, the sensory-motor and pre-operational stages,
occur early in life and move quickly.' The sensor-motor phase
is characterized by "think[ing] in a sensorimotor fashion, that
is ... thinking is directly linked to immediate sensory
experience."' The pre-operational stage "principally involves
increasing ability to use and to form symbols," including, most
importantly, lanpuage. 6 The later two stages run longer and are
more complex.
Thus, the third stage, concrete-operational,
runs from about age six to middle adolescence, and the fourth
stage, operational, takes hold thereafter.8 Professor Williams
summarizes these stages in this way:
[T]he difference between concrete and formal operational
thinking turns on the ability to manipulate abstractions
derived from concrete experience. Most of Piaget's research
involved scientific concepts, but he argued that the general
principles held for all kinds of thinking: Can the person
juggle multiple hypothetical variables and then combine and
recombine them to predict different outcomes? Can the
person project probabilities? Can the person reason from the
intersection of logical sets and from empty sets? 9
The broader point is that Piaget described intellectual growth
in universal, predictable stages.
"All children, Piaget
concluded, go through each of these stages. More importantly,
they all go through them in the same sequence."' 0
Like Piaget, Kohlberg described intellectual growth in stages,
but Kohlberg focused specifically on the development of moral
reasoning." Kohlberg argued that we develop in roughly three
stages.
Kohlberg's first stage, the pre-conventional stage,
reflects a crude moral reasoning that focuses only on the
immediate, short-term consequences of one's behavior.' PreWilliams, supra note 1, at 3-4.
5. Wangerin, supra note 1, at 1243.
6. Id.
4.

7. Id.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Wangerin, supra note 1, at 1244.
11. Williams, supra note 1, at 5-6; see also Wangerin, supra note 1, at
1274-81.
12. Williams, supra note 1, at 5-6.
13. Id.
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conventional moral reasoning, then, is concerned only with
immediate punishments and rewards.14 The second stage, the
conventional stage, reflects broader concern for one's family,
one's community and even one's nation." The broader values
in these groups are the driving forces behind one's moral
decision-making.' 6 The final stage, post-conventional, reflects
more abstract values that transcend any particular community.1 7
Moral values in this final stage move toward the universal.'
In the spirit of Piaget and Kohlberg-and roughly correlating
to their stages-William Perry has identified nine stages of
development, which for our broader purpose, we can collapse
into three.1 9 Perry's system is particularly attractive to college
curriculum planners because it focuses on the growth of college
students. It is useful here because it also closely describes the
development of first-year law students.
Perry's first stage, dualism, is characterized by a student's
desire to learn definitive, objective and concrete right and
wrong answers from an authority. 20 Dualism helps explain, for
example, why so many first-year students rely on commercial
outlines (because they provide concrete, definitive statements of
the law). It also helps explain why many of them unduly focus
on niceties and form over substance and analysis in their writing
(because form often has an objectively correct approach, where
analysis is often indeterminate). And it helps explain why they
often become so frustrated with the professors' mantra "it
depends" (because it represents indeterminacy). In short, the
dualist aims to get his or her arms around a subject so as to rest
comfortably in the belief that he or she "knows" it. But in fact,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Williams, supra note 1, at 5-6.
Id.
19. Perry described his nine-stage scheme in
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.

WILLIAM G. PERRY, FORMS
OF INTELLECTUAL AND ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE COLLEGE YEARS

(1970). This very brief description collapses Perry's much richer system for
the purpose of brevity and in order to highlight the features of Perry's system
that are most relevant for my purposes here. This three-stage summary of
Perry's nine-stage scheme follows Paul Wangerin's summary. Wangerin,
supra note 1, at 1244-51; see also Williams, supra note 1, at 4-6.
20. Wangerin, supra note 1, at 1246-47.
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the dualist knows only form, formulae and formalism. By
focusing primarily on the determinate, the dualist misses the
bigger picture.
The second stage, relativism or multiplicity, follows after the
student learns that knowledge is not determinate, that there is
not always a concrete right and wrong answer and that opinions
on a question often differ even (or especially) among experts.21
At its highest stage, relativism is characterized by an acceptance
of all views and complete deference to none:
[The relativist] assumes that an answer can be called "right"
only in the light of its context, and that contexts or "frames
of reference" differ. He assumes that several interpretations
of a poem, explanations of a historical development, or even
theories of a class of events in physics may be legitimate
"depending on how you look at it.". .. [H]e ... supposes
that the [teacher] may be about to present three legitimate
theories which can be examined for their internal coherence,
their scope their fit with various data, their predictive
power, etc.2
Relativism helps explain why students near the end of the
first semester often relish opportunities to argue any side (or
even both sides) of any debate, no matter how inconsequential.
It may also help explain why some students who enroll in law
school with firm moral commitments later become alienated:
some of these students may feel that in their new-found
relativism, they have lost their purpose in studying the law,
while others who have successfully resisted relativism may find
themselves sad and alone among relativists.
Perry's final stage, reflective thinking or commitment, is
characterized by an understanding that views are diverse and
often diverge, but it is also characterized by a considered
commitment to a particular view. 23
We sometimes see
reflective thinking and commitment in thoughtful and balanced
student papers in upper-level seminars or in good student law
review notes, where students consider various positions and

21. Id. at 1248-50.
22. Id. at 1250 (PERRY, supra note 19, at 2 (describing sub-stages of

relativism)).
23. Id. at 1259-73 (describing sub-stages of commitment); see also
Williams, supra note 1, at 4.
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then commit, for principled reasons, to one. We also often see
commitment in well supervised student clinical work, where
students elect a particular clinic because of their reflective
commitments to the work of the clinic and where their own
clinical work and further reflection often reinforce their initial
commitment.
Finally, we sometimes see commitment in
students' post-graduate choices, when students are able to make
reflective and principled decisions about their careers.
III. THE FIRST-YEAR CURRICULUM AND OUR STUDENTS
The traditional first-year curriculum is precisely tailored to
take our incoming students from Perry's dualistic stage to a
relativistic stage, tracking the first two steps in this sequence
exactly.2 4 Against the backdrop of our students' stages of
development, the first-year curriculum seems specifically
designed to meet our students exactly where they are and to
push them gently along in their development. We start by
training students as dualists. For example, our early and
exclusive focus on sanitized appellate opinions-where facts
are fixed and determined law applies rotely and deductivelyreaches our dualists by suggesting that learning and practicing
the law are merely exercises in syllogistic reasoning. Similarly,
traditional essay exams reach our dualists by suggesting that
there are objectively right and wrong ways of understanding and
analyzing the law. (Multiple choice exams suggest this even
more strongly.) Finally, in order to study first-year courses, we
make available any number of study aides, most of which are
designed to deliver the clear, objective law to our students in the
most efficient manner possible. These defining features of the
traditional first-year curriculum are classically dualistic: they
teach our students that the law is about right and wrong in an
objective, determinate world.
Moreover, the traditional Socratic Method teaches our
students that the law is outside of themselves-that it is created
by others and given to them. The Socratic form thus suggests to
students that the instructor, the casebook, the commercial
materials-the experts, and not the students themselves-hold
the keys to understanding the law. In the language of critical

24. See chart infra p. 41.
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and progressive educator Paulo Freire, students are merely
passive and empty "containers" or "'receptacles' to be 'filled'
by the teacher"-the expert law professor.2 5 The law itself is
fixed and pre-existing in relation to our incoming students:
while it was created, to be sure, by someone, it cannot be
changed by our students. These features of the traditional
Socratic Method buttress the dualistic nature of the early first
semester by reinforcing the idea of a given, fixed and external
law that is knowable in an objective way.
First-year legal writing courses reinforce these other features
of the curriculum in nurturing our students' dualism. The
central feature of these courses is nearly always a well vetted
simulation-a problem that the professor designed to meet
particular educational objectives. However, in designing the
problem, the professor by necessity traces every possible path
between the facts and the law, defining every argument and
mode of analysis to ensure that the problem meets the objectives
without a hitch. We even have a term for such a well vetted
problem: it "works." In these classes, where the subject itself is
legal analysis and communication, a simulation-or a problem
for which the professor by necessity already defined the modes
of legal analysis-meets our dualists' needs by showing them
that the subject is objective and determined and outside of
themselves.
But even as we nurture our students' dualism, we also nudge
them along. As our students progress through the first semester,
we teach them as relativists.
We teach them legal
argumentation and advocacy, and we show them how to
manipulate arguments to favor either side of a dispute. In
doctrinal courses, we teach them modes of legal and policy
arguments, the corresponding counter-arguments and critiques
of both. Through the Socratic Method, we often teach them that
there is no single right answer for the professor (the students'
primary authority on the law) and that each of the multiple
potential answers is equally valid.2 6 In moot court competitions
and legal writing courses, we often arbitrarily assign students a
party and instruct them to argue zealously, without respect to

25. PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 52-53 (Continuum
1995).
26. Thanks to student editor Greg Frayser for this insight.
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their moral commitments about the case. We sometimes even
require them to change sides mid-course and urge them to
abandon their moral commitments in favor of arguing zealously
on behalf of their clients. In short, we nurture our relativists by
teaching them to argue anything, to be "hired guns."
The following chart summarizes this cognitive development
of students in traditional first-year law courses:
Moral and Cognitive Development in Law School:
Stage of
Development

Student
Characteristics

What We Do in
Law School

- Desire

for"Black-

Letter" Law
Dualist

- Focus on
Authority
- Focus on
Details, Format,

& Citation
Timid
- Enthusiasm for
Arguing Either

Side of a Case:
Relativist

"Hired Gun"
- Enthusiasm for

Zealous
Advocacy
- Thoughtful,

Mature
Reflective

- Act as "Agents"

Able to Deal
with
Indeterminacy

- Focus on

Determinate Law
and Facts
- Focus on
Authority
- Focus on Details

Intimidate

- Focus on

Hypotheticals
- Teach Students
to Argue Both

Sides

- Seminars and

Clinics
- Introduce

Indeterminacies
in Law, Policy
and Practice
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Our traditional first-year curriculum works: our students'
movement from dualism to relativism in the first semester is
palpable. We see this in our students' language, in their
questions and in their analysis. Early on, they seek "rules" and
"holdings;" they often ask about the "black-letter law." As a
second-semester student recently asked me in the hopelessly
indeterminate first few weeks of my Constitutional Law class,
"What are we supposed to be getting out of this? I mean: what
are we supposed to be memorizing?" Later, we hear our
students experiment with different arguments, taking opposing
positions, poking holes in others' arguments and relishing the
role of devil's advocate-often not out of any driving moral or
even legal principle, but for its own sake.
Thus, our
transformation is complete: we have succeeded in moving our
students from dualism to relativism.
There is only one problem: our students started in law school
further along the curve.
Our students increasingly come to us with a vast array of
significant life experiences. All have a college degree. More
and more have completed graduate or professional school.
Many have worked full-time and traveled before enrolling.
Some even had fully successful careers before coming to law
school. Many have families, own homes and have taken on
significant financial responsibilities (like law school loans).
Our entering students may be novices in the law, but they are by
and large more mature thinkers in other areas of their lives.
Using the developmental terms, they are more often advanced
relativists and reflective thinkers than they are dualists. And
they are capable of applying their more mature traits to their
study of the law.2 7

27. The few available empirical studies seem to bear these conclusions
out. Researchers seem to agree that law students "rely on formal rules and
societal conventions more than other groups and may have exhibited a more
homogeneous stage of moral development within the group than other
groups." Moreover, law students do not seem to develop-and some claim
that law students actually decline-from this conventional stage (in
Kohlberg's system). Daicoff, supra note 1, at 207-08 (summarizing some of
the conclusions based on empirical studies of law students' moral
development, and concluding that they have resulted in "conflicting
findings"); see also Hartwell, supra note 1, at 522-31 (describing Professor
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The traditional first-semester curriculum, with its emphasis
on the move from dualism to relativism, thus regresses our
students before it re-progresses them, or in other words, it
breaks them down before it builds them back up. This is not
merely duplicative and a waste of time; it is affirmatively
harmful. By regressing our students and teaching them to be
dualists, we alienate them from the law itself. By teaching them
that the law is objective and determinate and that facts are fixed,
we disempower them. We show them that they are passive
recipients of the law and facts, not active agents in creating and
developing the law and facts.
In regressing our students, we also fail to paint an accurate
picture of the practice of law and ill prepare them to be good
attorneys. As practicing attorneys well know, the law is often
indeterminate. It contains gaps and holes, and attorneys, clients,
judges and others play an active role every day in constructing
the law. They play an even more active role in construing the
facts. But we teach our dualists that these concepts are fixed
and that their job is merely to apply the law robotically to the
facts and produce a conclusion. This regresses our students
intellectually, presents an inaccurate picture of the practice of
law and alienates students from the real business of attorneys:
actively making their cases and thus making the law.
Nudging our students on to a relativistic stage does nothing to
temper these harms; instead, it amplifies them. Relativism leads
to further alienation. We alienate a good number of those
students who came to law school for principled reasons and
with reflective moral commitments. These students either lose
their reflective commitments (and thus forget why they came to
law school in the first place) or find themselves alone among
dualists and disenchanted with the experience. Relativism also
reinforces the static view of law and facts that we give our
dualistic students.
Perhaps worst of all, this process of regression and
reprogramming misses a significant opportunity to capitalize on
our students' reflective capabilities in other areas of their lives
and thus significantly enhance their education. Incoming

Hartwell's conclusion that students improved on the Kohlberg-based
Defining Issues Test (the "DIT") after participating in "experientially taught
professional responsibility courses").
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students know how to resolve competing interests, solve
complicated problems and arrive at thoughtful, balanced and
considered conclusions in important areas of their lives. We
can and should build on these reflective capabilities (rather than
crushing them) by showing our incoming students how to apply
them in the law. If we can do this, our students can produce
better quality work, more useful work and work that better
reflects actual practice as early as their first semester (not the
third year, or beyond). Moreover, if we can do this, we can
begin to treat our adult, professional students with the dignity
and respect that they deserve.
The best way to achieve these complicated goals is to
introduce actual legal work into the first-year curriculum.
IV. ACTUAL LEGAL WORK IN THE FIRST YEAR
Actual legal work in the first year based on a live case or
problem may help avoid this regression and allow us to build
upon students' intellectual and moral reasoning capabilities.
Actual legal work, unlike the typical case studies in the first
year, involves the necessarily indeterminate facts of a live client
or actual problem. It involves evolving law (by its nature,
because nearly any case or problem helps evolve the law). In
addition, it involves faculty and other authorities that, while
more experienced than the students in the law, are no more
experts in the actual case or problem than the students
themselves. Actual legal work in the first year thus re-situates
students in relation to the law and to the faculty. Students
become partners in their own education and in the case, not
mere empty receptacles for information. It thus empowers
students, rather than alienates them.
Moreover, actual legal work in the first year demands that
students draw upon their reflective capabilities. Students are
faced with complicated and often indeterminate law drawn from
a variety of sources. They must deal with difficult and
inconsistent facts, and they must reflect upon and balance
competing considerations to help their clients commit to a
position, strategy or course of action. Actual legal work
uniquely requires students to use their reflective capabilities; it
naturally capitalizes upon them.
The following is a discussion of three different ways I have
tried to achieve these goals.
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A. First-YearLegal Theory and Practice
My most comprehensive experience with actual legal work in
the first year was based upon a second-semester course I taught
(and co-taught) at the University of Maryland School of Law
involving state constitutional issues, torts and civil procedure. 28
This six-credit course encompassed the required elective and the
required legal research and writing courses. The classes were
small, limited to 18 students. Students indicated a preference
for the class in enrollment, and students were accepted based on
a lottery.
Each student worked on two problems: an actual police
brutality claim and a separate law reform project. On the police
brutality cases, students worked in three and four-person teams,
engaging in anything from informal fact investigation to trial,
depending on the case. Their work on various aspects of the
cases showed them first-hand that law and facts are often
indeterminate; client stories are rarely straightforward and
nearly always complemented, supplemented or contradicted by
others' stories, and the law rarely applies in a clear,
straightforward way. The cases' inherent and broader legal and
political contexts often complicated their work, adding factors
beyond the mere facts and law that students had to consider in
designing a case strategy. Finally, the students' collaborative
work and their close work with supervising faculty and
attorneys showed them how law is often constructed, not given,
thus reinforcing the indeterminacy of the law. The featuresand the immediacy and importance of actual legal worksimply cannot be replicated in the study of edited appellate
decisions or even in classroom simulations.
On the law reform project, we worked collaboratively as a
class in developing strategies and sharing research, but students
submitted their own individual written work. Two of the three
years the classes worked on the procedural and legal aspects of
a state constitutional civil right to counsel (or "Civil Gideon"),

28. I am deeply indebted to my co-teacher, mentor, and inspiration for
this work, Professor Michael Millemann of the University of Maryland
School of Law. Our work on yet a different model, not described in this
article, is detailed in Michael A. Millemann and Steven D. Schwinn,
Teaching Legal Research and Writing with Actual Legal Work: Extending
Clinical Education into the First Year, 12 CLINICAL L. REv. 441 (2006).
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and one year the class worked on state official immunities in the
context of state constitutional tort claims. These issues were all
in their nascent stages, and the students themselves worked up
the legal theories. The law in these areas was indeterminate by
definition, so the students were developing new legal theories
and test cases in these areas. Thus the cases reinforced the
indeterminate nature of law and required students to endeavor to
make the law, not merely to apply it rotely. The faculty and
cooperating counsel were truly partners, not authorities, as we
were developing theories of our own even as we supervised our
students' work. As a result, we valued students' participation
and drew regularly on their ideas. Class discussions were an
exercise in group reflective thinking: we shared ideas, balanced
interests and committed to an approach. We, the faculty,
dictated nothing but the barest outlines of the process-and only
to ensure that we satisfied the basic learning objectives and
lessons of the underlying course.
Students in these courses consistently commented on the
value of actual legal work in the first year-and the differences
between this class and their other first-year courses. Students
reported a heightened level of engagement in class, a sense of
partnership with the faculty and cooperating attorneys and an
empowering sense that they were making a difference in the law
and in their cases. They also reported that they felt respected, or
"treated like an adult," in contrast to many of their other firstyear courses, where they often felt intimidated, confused,
alienated or helpless. 29 Although they did not speak in terms of
developmental learning theory, much of their feedback
suggested that they felt as though the courses offered them an
opportunity to grow, not regress, as both people and as students
of the law.
B. First-Year ConstitutionalLaw andAppellate Advocacy
My second experiment involved a two-course package in the
summer session between the first and second years that
combined Constitutional Law II-the individual rights

29. Students reported these effects even on the law reform projects, where
students never even met a traditional client. The immediacy and the
practicality of the work seems to have counter-balanced the missing client in
these projects.
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component of Constitutional Law-with the required appellate
advocacy course at the University of Maryland School of Law.
My students were required to enroll in these courses
concurrently in order to explore theory (through the
Constitutional Law course) along with practice (in the Appellate
Advocacy course).
Like the courses described above, this course was relatively
small-only 24 students enrolled-and students voluntarily
enrolled in these concurrent courses (but without first knowing
the case on which we would work). I divided students into four
teams of between six to eight students each and assigned each
group a legal issue involved in the same-sex marriage case then
before the Maryland Court of Appeals. I asked students to write
an appellate brief on their assigned issue; I would later
consolidate their work and help to incorporate it into an amicus
brief that the faculty at the University of Maryland submitted
for the case. But, I allowed students to develop arguments for
either the plaintiffs or the state for two reasons. First, some
students expressed a moral discomfort with same-sex marriage,
and arguing for the state would avoid forcing them to argue as
"hired guns." Second, I anticipated that state-side arguments
would serve our project every bit as well as generating plaintiffside arguments.
The legal issues here, too, were by definition indeterminate:
the case and, derivatively, our work on it, existed only because
the state constitutional issues were unsettled. The case thus
highlighted the indeterminate nature of the law, not the settled
nature of the law. The students worked side-by-side with me as
we developed theories and arguments together in the case, thus
reinforcing their roles as agents of law reform, not passive
receptacles of the law. Importantly, we devoted much class
time to moral and policy discussions about same-sex marriage,
placing the case in larger moral and political contexts and
allowing students to explore and reflect upon broader
considerations of morals and politics in crafting their
approaches.
Many of these discussions were predictably
contentious, just as discussions among the attorneys in the case
were predictably contentious. But our conscious efforts and our
focus on the larger project-the case, and our pedagogical goals
in using the experiential model-helped avoid marginalization
of dissenting voices.
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Students universally reported effects very much like those
described above in sub-part A. Notably, even those students
who wrote briefs for the state-knowing that their work would
ultimately be used to support arguments for same-sex
marriage-reported the same high level of engagement as other
students in the class. One student who wrote for the state was
unusually engaged throughout the semester: I suspect he saw
the case as a challenge to his moral commitment against samesex marriage. After a semester of thought and reflection on his
moral commitment, and constitutional research on the issue, he
told me that his moral commitment against same-sex marriage
had not changed. (In some ways, his moral commitment
strengthened, because the case pushed him to respond to
counter-arguments.) But he nevertheless said he had a hard
time making any constitutional case against same-sex marriage.
As with the law reform projects described above in sub-part
A, the immediacy and importance of the case seemed to
outweigh the lack of an actual client in motivating the students
to engage and perform. Again, while students did not speak in
terms of developmental learning theory, their comments on the
course suggested that they appreciated it precisely because they
progressed, not regressed, as intellectual and moral thinkers.
C. First-SemesterCase Work
In my third effort to build upon students' reflective
capabilities, I experimented with actual legal work in my firstsemester legal writing course at The John Marshall Law School
in Chicago. This was a three-credit course with 23 pre-assigned
students in the Fall Semester 2007. Our legal work was in
support of a pro bono client of mine, a displaced worker who
lost her appeal of a denial of trade adjustment assistance at the
U.S. Court of International Trade. I asked my first-semester
students to write a series of memos advising me and our client
on the merits of an appeal to the Federal Circuit.
This case had none of the factual or legal indeterminacies of
the classes described above. My students never met our client,
they never engaged in any fact investigation (because the record
was set) and they were not seeking to reform the law in any
major way. Moreover, neither the factual nor legal issues raised
the kind of broad ethical questions or deep policy issues as the
cases described above. In many ways, this case was exactly like
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a simulated problem that a professor might use in any firstsemester legal writing course; the biggest difference was that it
was real.
Nevertheless, students moved forward developmentally in
significant ways. Most importantly, students saw themselves as
active agents in the development of a case, not passive
recipients of lessons from a case long-ago decided or actors in a
simulation that I had previously worked out. Students were
actually developing the case, not merely retracing steps that I
had already taken. Moreover, their work as a class was quite
good and turned out to have a major impact in the direction of
the case. Perhaps most surprisingly, given the facially dry
nature of the case, as a class we engaged in serious moral
discussions about the case by the end of the semester.
Like the other courses described above, I worked alongside
the students in developing our case. I tried to offer guidance,
but not directives, and my students very quickly became nearly
as expert in the case as me. (And they knew it.) As in the
courses described in sub-parts A and B, the immediacy of this
case directly impacted the students' engagement with it.
Given that the immediacy was the only feature of this
experiment that differed from a traditional, hypothetical
simulation in a first-semester writing course, this course
suggests that even actual legal work alone-without
indeterminacies, without broad legal and political implications
and without obvious moral issues-can yield important results.
V. CONCLUSION

The typical first-year curriculum seems designed to meet our
incoming students where they are with regard to their
development and knowledge of the law. It thus seeks to teach
them the law using the most efficient and effective means.
However, in doing so, it ignores the mature reasoning
capabilities that our incoming students bring to law school, even
if not in the law. Ignoring these capabilities results not only in
lost opportunities; it also results in regression: we regress our
students along the developmental continuum before we reprogress them. Actual legal work in the first year is a better
way to capitalize on students' capabilities and nudge them
forward as developing attorneys.

